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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Words "Civil or Criminal" in Clayton Act Section 5
Do Not Include Federal Trade Commission
Proceedings-Highland Supply Corp. v.
Reynolds Metals Co.
In a private antitrust action for treble damages filed in 1963,1
plaintiff referred in its complaint to a Federal Trade Commission
proceeding brought against the defendant in 1957,2 which had
resulted in a final divestiture order.3 Defendant moved to strike
these references in the complaint on the ground that section 5(a) of
the Clayton Act, which authorizes private parties to utilize a government "judgment or decree . . . rendered in any civil or criminal
proceeding" as prima facie evidence in subsequent treble damage
suits,4 does not include a Federal Trade Commission proceeding.
Defendant also moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that the
claim was barred by the Clayton Act's four-year statute of limitations/' since the allegedly illegal acts occurred in 1957. The defendant
claimed that, because the act's tolling provision in section 5(b) is
limited to a "civil or criminal proceeding . . . instituted by the
United States," it also does not apply to a Federal Trade Commission
proceeding.6 Held, motions sustained. An FTC proceeding is not
"civil or criminal" within the meaning of section 5 of the Clayton
1. Treble damage suits are authorized by Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914),
§ 15 (1958).
2. Reynolds Metals Co., 56 F.T.C. 743 (1960), noted in 13 STAN. L. REv. 127 (1960).
3. This order was affirmed on appeal to the circuit court. Reynolds Metals Co. v.
FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962), noted in 51· CALIF. L. REv. 597 (1963); 1963 DuKE
L.J. 335.
4. 69 Stat. 283 (1955), 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(a)•{b) (1958) [Clayton Act §§ 5a•b] provides:
"(a) A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil
or criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the
antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima
facie evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any
other party against such defendant under said laws or by the United States
under section 15a [Clayton Act 4a] of this title, as to all matters respecting which
said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto.•••"
"(b) Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States
to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not
including an action under section 15a of this title, the running of the statute of
limitations in respect of every private right of action arising under said laws
and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding
shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter:
Provided, however, that whenever the running of the statute of limitations in
respect of a cause of action arising under section 15 of this title is suspended
hereunder, any action to enforce such cause of action shall be forever barred
unless commenced either within the period of suspension or within four years
after the cause of action accured." (Emphasis added in both text and footnote.)
5. See note 4 supra.
6. The court further considered the question, also involving the statute of limitations, of when the cause of action accrued. This problem will not be examined herein.
15

u.s.c.
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Act; consequently, the Commission's order is not admissible as
prima fade evidence in a subsequent private suit, and its proceedings do not toll the statute of limitations.7 Highland Supply Corp. v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 221 F. Supp. 15 (E.D. Mo. 1963), rev'd on
other grounds, 327 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1964).8
Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes a party injured by violations of the antitrust laws to bring suit for treble damages.9 In enacting section 5(a), Congress hoped to ease the burden of maintaining
these suits by allowing the introduction of a prior government
judgment or decree as prima fade evidence of a violation. 10 By
virtue of this assistance, not only are private litigants compensated
for their losses, but a formidable deterrent is posed to would-be
violators of the antitrust laws.11 Section 5(b) complements section
5(a) by suspending the statute of limitations during the pendency of
such government proceedings, thus enabling the private litigant to
utilize them fully. 12 The proceedings referred to in both sections 5(a)
and 5(b) are described as "civil or criminal." This use of identical
terminology and the existence of a common purpose for both provisions indicates that they may, and indeed should, be construed
together in order to determine whether such words include an FTC
1. Accord, Farmington Dowel Prod. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 967
(S.D. Me. 1963); Proper v. John Bene &: Sons, 295 Fed. 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1923). Contra,
New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining &: Mfg. Co., 216 F. Supp. 507
(D.N.J. 196!1). Cf. United States v. Uaited Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, !156 (D.
Mass. 1950); Sampson Crane Co. v. Union Nat'l Sales, 87 F. Supp. 218 (D. Mass. 1949),
afj'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950).
8. On the issue of when the cause of action accrued, the district court held that the
dates of defendant's acquisition of Arrow Brands and of Arrow Brands' price reduction
marked overt acts which could give rise to a cause of action, and that, since these
events occurred more than four years prior to the filing of the present suit, the action
was barred by the statute of limitations. The court, therefore, dismissed the complaint
with prejudice. In reversing, the circuit court asserted that the existence of the
monopoly power and its abuse by price fixing gives rise to a cause of action under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act. Since it did not appear in the complaint when the monopoly
power ceased, plaintiff might have shown injury from alleged Sherman Act violations
within the limitation period. Consequently, the court held that the plaintiff sho~ld
have been granted leave to amend his complaint under FED. R. CIV. P. 15, which
provides that amendments are to be freely allowed.
The circuit court approved the lower court's conclusions regarding the use of FTC
proceedings. It stated that the terms "civil" and "criminal" are unambiguous and
clearly exclude FTC action and asserted that resort to legislative history is justified
only when the statutory language is ambiguous. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert
Distillers Corp., !141 U.S. !184 (1951); HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1920).
9. Clayton Act § 4, !18 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
10. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558 (1951); S. REP. No.
619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. REP. No. 627, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914). In
the absence of this legislation, it is clear that a decree rendered in a government suit
could not be introduced as evidence in subsequent private litigation. See Chantangco
v. Abaroa, 218 U.S. 476 (1910).
11. For a more expansive discussion of this point, see 62 MICH. L. REV. 326 (1963).
12. S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).

402

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 63

proceeding.18 If an FTC order is admissible as prima fade evidence,
the proceeding should also suspend the statute of limitations.14
The prevailing meaning of "civil or criminal" would seem to
exclude FTC proceedings. These terms have been used primarily to
refer to judicial proceedings conducted before a court,15 while hearings held by the Commission have been typically characterized as
administrative.16 Nevertheless, one district court has held that FTC
proceedings fall within the meaning of section 5 and therefore toll
the statute of limitations.17 That court pointed out that the Commission and the Attorney General exercise concurrent jurisdiction over
violations of sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act,18 and it could
see no reason why the result of a proceeding by the Commission
should not be available as prima fade evidence when, if the Attorney
General had prosecuted the case, the resulting decree could have
been so used. If such a distinction were drawn, a plaintiff's burden
of proof would depend upon the fortuitous circumstance of which
branch of the government instituted proceedings.19 Consequently,
that court reasoned that the distinction beween judicial and administrative proceedings is meaningless in this context. While such an
approach would advance the statute's policy of increasing private
recovery by making all government actions available to the private
litigant, it does not appear that Congress intended to go this far.
Although the general policies which prompted the enactment of a
law are valuable interpretation aids, they are not infallible guides to
congressional intent.20
13. When the same words are used in different parts of a statute, they are presumed
to have the same meaning. Schooler v. United States, 231 F.2d 560 (8th Cir. 1956);
MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 13 (1953).
14. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961); Farming•
ton Dowel Prod. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 967 (S.D. Me. 196!1).
15. See, e.g., Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 499 (1884); Klepinger v. Rhodes, 140 F.2d
697 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Kansas City So. Ry. v. Ogden Levee Dist., 15 F.2d 637 (8th Cir.
1926). In Gillson v. Vendome Petroleum Corp., 35 F. Supp. 815, 819 (E.D. La. 1940),
the court pointed out that a "suit" is "any legal proceeding in a court of justice,"
and a "civil action" is "every species of 'suit' not of a criminal kind."
16. E.g., FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952); COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
AND COURTS 360-70 (1951). Although it is occasionally stated that the FTC discharges
a judicial rather than a legislative function, no instance has been found where an FTC
hearing has been referred to in ordinary usage as a "judicial" proceeding-and legislative intent is normally ascertained from ordinary usage. See, e.g., Miller v. Robertson,
266 U.S. 243 (1924); DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U.S. 376 (1919).
17. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 216 F. Supp.
507 (D.N.J. 1963).
18. Compare Clayton Act § 15, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1958), with
Clayton Act § 11, 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (Supp. V, 1964),
19. Cf. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir, 1961), cert. denied,
370 U.S. 937 (1962), where the Ninth Circuit applied the same standard of review to
FTC proceedings as is applied in reviewing district court actions instituted by the
Department of Justice. By so doing, the court obviated the problem of having the
result on review depend in part upon which branch of the government brings suit.
20. CRAWFORD, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 246-48 (1940); Frankfurter, Some Reflec•
tions on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLUM, L. REv. 527, 535-39 (1947).

December 1964)

Recent Developments

403

In this case, the legislative history provides somewhat more
guidance than apparent policy considerations. The version of section
5 currently in force was embodied in a 1955 amendment,21 the main
purposes of which were to establish a uniform statute of limitations
(which previously had depended on state law) and to enable the
government to bring damage suits.22 Prior to this amendment, the
pertinent language was "any suit or proceedings in equity or criminal prosecution."28 One court has pointed out that, in light of
modem procedure,24 the reference to a "proceeding in equity" had
become obsolete; it suggested that the purpose of the change embodied in the amendment was merely to streamline the language-not to
change its scope;215 If this analysis is correct, and it appears to be the
most reasonable one, the meaning of the provision depends upon the
intent of Congress at the time of the statute's initial passage.
Although the congressional reports relating to the original statute do not deal specifically with the problem here under examination, the discussions held seem to have been premised upon the
assumption that the provision referred only to judicial proceedings.
In debating section 5, the congressmen referred explicitly to equity
and criminal actions without mentioning FTC proceedings.26 The
language used in the original act itself seems to require the same
conclusion, for "proceeding in equity" and "criminal prosecution"
connote a judicial rather than an administrative proceeding.27 In
this connection it should be noted that the Supreme Court has explained that the FTC neither conducts a criminal hearing28 nor
21. 69 Stat. 283 (1955).
22. S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
23. Clayton Act § 5, 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
24. FED. R. Cxv. P. 2.
~
25. Farmington Dowel Prod. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 223 F. Supp. 967 (S.D. Me.
1963). Another explanation of the change might be that Congress adopted a proposal
of the Arr'y GEN. NAT'L CoMM. ANnrn.usr REP. 384 (1955): "a. The reference should be
to any civil or criminal action under Sections 1, 2, 3, or 4 of the Sherman Act, Sections
73 or 74 of the Wilson Tariff Act, Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act (in the event
it is applicable under Section 15 of the Clayton Act), or Section 15 of the Clayton Act,
thus -making clear the intent uniformly to govern all actions involving some antitrust
cause."
It should be noted that this list does note include § 11 of the Clayton Act, which
authorizes FTC action. If the intent was to incorporate this recommendation into
the amendment, it is a fair inference that Congress intended only the statutes included
in the list to be encompassed by the phrase "civil or criminal." It is quite likely that
the framers were aware of the recommendation, since the amendment incorporatd
other proposals by the Committee. See S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
26. See S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914). At 51 Corm. REc. 13851 (1914), Senator Walsh stated: "If the United
States shall proceed against any organization • • • and eventually, after a judicial
proceeding going through all the courts, it shall be determined and decided that the
organization is a combination in violation of the Sherman Act • • . .'' (Emphasis
added.)
27. A proceeding in equity is clearly a type of civil action. If a civil action is judicial, it follows that an equity proceeding is judicial. See note 9 supra.
28. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
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exercises the authority of a court of equity.29 Other language in the
statute also suggests that FTC action is excluded. For example,
section 15 authorizes the Attorney General to "institute proceedings
in equity,"30 which is the same language as that used in the original
section 5. Since identical language used in different provisions of a
statute is presumed to have the same meaning, 31 it can be inferred
that "proceedings in equity" in section 5 refer to those instituted by
the Attorney General. In contrast, the provision authorizing FTC
action is in the form of a grant of "authority to enforce compliance
with" the statute.32 This comparison suggests that Congress did not
regard an FTC proceeding as a "proceeding in equity" within the
meaning of section 5. Of further significance, section 5 authorizes
use of a "final judgment or decree" as prima fade evidence; but the
FTC issues an order, not a judgment or decree. 33 As a matter of
construction, the ordinary meaning of this language is presumed to
express legislative intent unless following it would lead to a result
patently inconsistent with the avowed policies of the statute.84
Regarding legislative intent, it would appear relevant that the
Federal Trade Commission Act, which created the FTC, was passed
in the same year as the Clayton Act.85 The legislators could not have
known what character or degree of reliability the novel FTC proceedings would have. As a matter of fact, for years after the establishment of the Commission, courts were wary of its findings. 86 In view
of the punitive nature of the private treble damage suit, it seems
quite unlikely that Congress intended an order based upon the
untested procedures of the FTC to be admissible in a later private
suit.87 Consequently, it appears that the statutory language correctly
expressed congressional intent.
While standard rules of construction seem to require the conclu29. FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
30. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1958).
31. Schooler v. United States, 231 F.2d 560 (8th Cir. 1956); MCCAFFREY, op. cit.
supra note 13, § 13.
32. 38 Stat. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (Supp. V, 1964).
33. It should be noted that 73 Stat. 243 (1959) amended § 11 of the Clayton Act
to provide for finality of FTC orders. In Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v. American
Bowling &: Billiard Corp., 150 F.2d 69, 74 (2d Cir. 1945), the court indicated that the
only barrier to the admission of an unreviewed FTC order was lack of finality. The
problem of whether the Commission conducts a judicial proceeding was not considered.
34. United States v. Missouri, Pac. R.R., 278 U.S. 269 (1929); Hilliard v. United
States, 310 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1962); McCAFFREY, op. cit. supra note 13, § 3. Cf. United
States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961); Los Angeles Mailers Local 9, AFL-CIO v. NLRB,
311 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
35. Compare Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), with Clayton Act,
38 Stat. 730 (1914).
36. See COOPER, op. cit. supra note 16, at 360-63; HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION 162-63, 328 (1924).
37. This evaluation gathers force from the fact that the provisions of the Clayton
Act were designed to be essentially preventive rather than punitive. International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947); FTC v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 5 F.2d 615 (3d
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sion that the Commission's proceedings are not encompassed by this
provision, there are certainly reasons of policy and logic for deciding
otherwise. Recently, and particularly since the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946,38 the Commission's proceedings
have acquired new stature, and courts generally have displayed
greater confidence in its findings. 39 Also to be considered is the fact
that, although the Department of Justice and the Commission exercise concurrent jurisdiction over violations of sections 2, 3, 7, and 8,
a pattern of enforcement has emerged which indicates that sections
2 and 3 are enforced almost exclusively by the FTC unless the violation is part of a larger Sherman Act indictment.40 As a result, a party
injured by price discrimination (section 2) or exclusive dealing
arrangements (section 3) must pursue his remedy without the aid of
a government order as evidence, even though the FTC may have
found that a defendant has violated the law. However, there is
clearly no expression of congressional policy that violations of these
provisions should receive different treatment in private suits than
infractions of sections 7 and 8. Moreover, even if the private suit is
based upon a violation of section 7 or 8, the plaintiff will not be able
to use the prior proceedings against the defendant if, fortuitously, the
FTC, and not the Attorney General, has taken the action.
Thus, the reasons for including FTC proceedings within the
reach of section 5 are quite persuasive. Moved by this need for
consistency, a court might use the expanded language of the 1955
amendment to rationalize an inference of a legislative intention to
bring Commission action within the scope of the statute. If, however,
the courts decline to make such an interpretation, it seems clear that
Congress should reconsider this problem.41
Cir. 1925), rev'd. on other grounds, 272 U.S. 554 (1926); United States v. Sears, Roebuck
&: Co., Ill F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Consequently, it seems probable that Congress

would hesitate to extend the criminal force of the statute beyond the procedures
which had been proved trustworthy.
38. 5 u.s.c. §§ 1001·11 (1958).
39. CooPER, op. cit. supra note 16, at 363-70.
40. A-rr'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM. .ArmTRusr REP. 376 (1955).
41. On this question, however, it might be wise to question the propriety of
allowing treble damages in all private cases. It is arguable that less proof of a violation is required by the FTC than by a court in a proceeding brought by the Attorney
General, and hence the use by private litigants of the results should be accorded
different treatment. While there might be a question of whether treble recovery should
be allowed on the basis of an FTC decision, it seems clear that such a decision should
at least support a single recovery not involving punitive elements. The A-rr'Y GEN.
NAT'L CoMM. .ANTilllusr REP. 378-80 (1955) recommended that treble recovery be
limited to cases of willful violations. Perhaps, the additional proof of willfulness would
sufficiently complement an FTC decision to justify treble recovery.

